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Abstract: 
L’elaborato prende in esame l’Unione Economica e Monetaria Europea con lo 
scopo di capire se può essere considerata un’area valutaria ottimale. Esaminando il 
pensiero degli esponenti della letteratura, si è dedotto che per definire un’area valutaria 
ottimale sia necessario considerare sei requisiti essenziali: la presenza di trasferimenti 
fiscali tra stati, un alto grado di integrazione economica e finanziaria, la sincronizzazione 
dei cicli economici, flessibilità dei salari e mobilità della forza lavoro. Applicando la 
teoria a dati empirici, si evince che quattro dei sei criteri presi in considerazione non 
vengono adeguatamente soddisfatti. Tale risultato porterebbe a dedurre che l’UEM non 
sia un’area valutaria ottimale, sottolineando la necessità di implementare le riforme 
sostanziali che modifichino l’attuale struttura dell’Unione. D’altro canto, questo processo 
di riforma si è mostrato nel corso degli anni di difficile realizzazione, in quanto ostacolato 
da importanti problemi, come il rischio di azzardo morale e la mancanza di un sentimento 
di comune appartenenza a un’unica nazione. Ne consegue una difficile situazione di stallo 
che apre però le porte a soluzioni alternative, come ad esempio la creazione di un’Europa 
a due velocità, che consentirebbe l’istituzione di due regioni monetarie più omogenee 
rispetto alla macroregione attuale, ma che a sua volta comporterebbe importanti rischi. 
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Introduction: 
In recent years, the possibility to leave the European Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU) has been at the centre of the Old Continent’s political debate. Undoubtedly, 
the introduction of the common currency has brought important benefits, especially in 
terms of trade, lower transaction costs, and exchange rate stability. On the other hand, the 
recent economic and sovereign debt crises have also evidenced the social costs of joining 
the monetary union, thus raising questions on the sustainability of the European project. 
In the light of these contrasting views, we aim to examine the large literature on the topic 
and reach a conclusion on whether the benefits of the euro offset its costs, or in other 
words, to assess if EMU is an optimal currency area. 
This subject is a very topical issue, especially considering the imminence of the 
next European Parliament election. Sovranist movements across Europe are openly 
supporting a return to national currencies to gain back monetary independence and avoid 
painful austerity measures. Oppositely, traditional parties see further integration as the 
major way to increase the wealth of European citizens. Given that the winning side is 
going to shape Europe for years, bringing more clarity to the issue becomes of crucial 
importance in order to take well-informed political decisions. Politics aside, the topic is 
also extremely instructive, as it paves the way to important considerations on the common 
currency’s future prospects. Indeed, building on the theory of optimal currency areas 
(OCA), it is possible to evaluate the fulfilment of theoretical requirements and in turn 
stress the fields in which urgent reforms are needed.  
To address all these issues, the work has been divided into three comprehensive 
chapters. Chapter one outlines the main findings of the OCA literature, placing particular 
stress on which criteria should be considered to assess whether a currency union is 
optimal or not. In addition, it examines the costs and benefits associated with the 
institution of a common currency, therefore giving a sound theoretical base to this 
research. Turning to the second chapter, it provides an application of the OCA criteria to 
the context of EMU by reviewing the most recent empirical research on the topic. 
Notably, substantial emphasis will be given to the analysis of important variables such as 
the level of economic integration, the frequency of asymmetric shocks, but also the 
availability of adequate fiscal transfers and the intensity of labour mobility among 
member states.  
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Finally, chapter three considers numerous proposals of reform, conducive to 
increase convergence towards the OCA criteria as well as to make of EMU a more 
functional monetary union. Indeed, the lack of basic adjustment tools – namely a federal 
budget, a lender of last resort facility and a solid banking union – is usually addressed as 
the reason behind the euro’s lacklustre performance. Alternatively, the chapter will 
consider the prospect of the so-called ‘two-speed Europe’. The latter is a recently on 
vogue concept, whose advantages and limitations will be discussed extensively.  
In sum, this work applies a solid theoretical framework to the empirical evidence, 
thus reaching conclusions on whether EMU is an optimal currency area, but also 
suggesting future prospects for the Union. According to Juselius (2011), such evidence-
based approach is an effective way to develop quality research in the economic field. 
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Chapter 1: The theory of optimum currency areas 
 
 1.1 The criteria for a successful currency union 
The theory of optimum currency areas (OCA) was originally developed by 
Mundell (1961), McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969). Their articles outline the criteria 
necessary for a region to qualify as an optimal currency area, namely an area in which the 
benefits of a common currency offset the costs of relinquishing national monetary policy. 
Building on this seminar literature, other authors such as Fleming (1971) and Rogoff 
(1985) extended the original theory and helped to further complete the OCA framework. 
Overall, six criteria can be identified: wage flexibility, labour mobility, fiscal transfers, 
coordinated business cycles, economic and financial integration. This section will provide 
a detailed analysis of the abovementioned requirements. 
Starting with the first two OCA criteria, Mundell (1961) argues that countries 
taking part to a currency union shall possess a flexible wage system as well as some 
degree of cross-country labour mobility in order to restore the equilibrium in the event of 
asymmetric shocks. The author commences his analysis by examining the case of a 
demand shift in a simple model of two countries, initially in full employment and balance-
of-payments equilibrium, that have abandoned their national currencies and are part of a 
currency union. In particular, consumers are assumed to unexpectedly shift their 
preferences away from country B-made to country A-made products, giving rise to an 
adjustment problem in both countries. Indeed, the shift of demand from B to A causes 
unemployment and output reduction in region B, while region A experiences a boom 
which also leads to inflationary pressures (see fig 1.1).  
Figure 1.1 Aggregate Demand and Supply in Country A and Country B.  
 
Source: De Grauwe (2018) 
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This is where the two aforementioned criteria – labour mobility and wage flexibility 
– come in to re-establish the equilibrium in the two countries. Indeed, if wages in country 
A and B are flexible, unemployed workers in B will reduce their wage claim while the 
excess of demand in A will push up the wage rate of country A. This determines a real 
appreciation in A and a real depreciation in B respectively. As a consequence, aggregate 
supply curve in B shifts downwards, making price more competitive and stimulating 
demand. The opposite occurs in country A instead (see figure 1.2). Similarly, labour 
market integration allows unemployed workers in country B to migrate where there is 
excess demand for labour (namely country A), therefore fixing divergences in 
unemployment. Also, this process eliminates the need to deflate wages, which is usually 
considered to be painful.  
 
Figure 1.2 The automatic adjustment process. 
 
Source: De Grauwe (2018) 
 
Nevertheless, if wages are rigid and labour mobility is limited, countries that form 
a monetary union will find it more difficult to adjust to asymmetric shocks than countries 
that have maintained their national currencies. Indeed, these countries retain the 
possibility to use their national monetary policy to adjust to the shock. Specifically, 
country B could have lowered its interest rate, consequently stimulating aggregate 
demand, while country A could have raised its interest rate thus reducing aggregate 
demand and controlling inflation. In a floating exchange rate regime, divergent monetary 
policies would have determined a depreciation of currency B, which in turn increases the 
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competitiveness of country B and takes back unemployment and output to the initial level 
(See figure 1.3).   
 
Figure 1.3 Effects of monetary expansion in Country B and monetary restriction 
in Country A 
 
Source: De Grauwe (2018) 
 
In sum, the higher the level of labour mobility and wage flexibility, the lower the 
costs of relinquishing national monetary policy and adopt a common currency. 
Importantly, the degree of labour mobility is determined by a number of factors including 
the implementation of a simplified visas system and the existence of cultural barriers that 
inhibit free movement of people such as linguistic diversity. Instead, the degree of wage 
flexibility depends on labour market institutions. Bruno and Sachs (1985) claim that with 
a centralized wage bargaining system, labour unions are more likely to consent wage 
moderation after a supply shock. Conversely, when the system is decentralised each union 
is incentivised in increasing the nominal wage of its members, therefore making it more 
difficult to adjust to shocks in real terms. 
Turning to the third criterion, Mundell (1973) addresses the implementation of 
interregional fiscal transfers as a necessary step to create an OCA, as it is argued to be the 
most effective way to contrast market shocks. More specifically, when a member of the 
union suffers a negative shock, the effects of the shock can be cushioned by fiscal 
transfers from the other members, allowing more expansionary fiscal policy than might 
otherwise be the case (e.g. the country could face constraints in government borrowing). 
The author argues that this system of international risk sharing is crucial to the success of 
an OCA, as placing the burden of recession and devaluation in one country or region 
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alone is unsustainable. Not to mention that the overall economy of the region – usually 
highly integrated - would benefit from absorbing economic shocks. Nevertheless, this 
criterion is controversial as it is politically difficult to sell in individual countries. Indeed, 
countries with surpluses are generally unwilling to give up their revenue.  
As it has been stressed in the previous paragraphs, asymmetric shocks can 
critically call into question the success of a monetary union. For this reason, the literature 
came to postulate the synchronisation of business cycles as a necessary OCA criterion 
(Rogoff, 1985; Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1997). Indeed, if currency union partners are 
more economically similar (namely they face more symmetric shocks and fewer 
asymmetric shocks), then it is less costly for them to form a currency union (Clarida et 
al. 1999). The rationale behind this criterion is based on the fact that the monetary 
authorities who have control of the common currencies need to set a common interest rate 
which fits all members’ economies. However, when shocks are asymmetric regions 
belonging to the same currency area have conflicting needs in term of monetary policy, 
resulting in a loss of effectiveness of the Central Bank’s actions.  
Building again on Mundell’s ‘shift in demand’ case, a monetary expansion 
exercised by the central bank authorities would alleviate recession in B, but it would also 
exacerbate inflationary pressures in region A. Similarly, a restrictive monetary policy 
would reduce inflation in country A while aggravating unemployment in B. In this case 
the central bank would not be able to use monetary policy as an effective economic tool 
to stabilize output. Therefore, a coordinated exposure to economic booms and busts is 
essential in order for the OCA’s central bank to operate effectively (Clarida et al. 1999).  
Another branch of the literature has placed emphasis on a fifth OCA criterion, that 
is to say the subsistence of economic integration among member states as an essential 
prerequisite to form a monetary union. In essence, national economies must be deeply 
embedded with each other in term of trade flows (i.e. by sharing a deep network of 
transnational supply chains and markets), diversification of production, and aligned 
economic policies in order to become an OCA. Different authors gave complementary 
perspectives on this topic, and the main findings from the literature will be examined on 
a chronological order in the following paragraphs. 
To begin with, McKinnon (1963) suggests that the higher the degree of openness 
to trade between two or more countries, the more arguments there are for having a 
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monetary union between them as economic integration increases. The logic behind this 
assertion is that a stronger trade integration among countries enhances the likelihood that 
foreign prices of tradables will be transmitted to the domestic cost of living. This effect 
would in turn cause the reduction of ‘money illusion’, namely the belief that money has 
a fixed value in terms of its purchasing power, implying that economic agents will 
automatically adjust wages and prices in accordance to exchange rate fluctuations. As a 
result, changes in exchange rate becomes less efficient in changing the terms of trade and 
less effective as an adjustment mechanism. Hence, very open economies would find it 
advantageous to fix the exchange rate and join a larger common currency area. Indeed, 
McKinnon (1963) argues that economies with a high ratio of tradables to non-tradables 
should rely more on alternative instruments, for example on fiscal policy, to resolve 
balance of payments problems.  
A second aspect is underlined by Kenen (1969), who measures economic 
integration by the degree of diversification in member countries’ economies and asserts 
that only countries that share a vastly diversified export sector in term of product mix 
would benefit from monetary unification. His argument proceeds as follows. If a country 
is not diversified and produces only few products which it also exports, its economy will 
be more exposed to negative demand shocks affecting its exports, therefore making a fall 
in revenues more likely. In this context the existence of a flexible exchange rate is 
essential, as falls in revenues can be attenuated by currency depreciation. Conversely, in 
a currency union or a fixed exchange rate regime, adjustments can be achieved just 
through a reduction of wages and through increased unemployment. It follows that if 
these shocks are recurrent, a currency union becomes unsustainable in the long term. 
Instead, a well-diversified economy benefits of diversification in the export sector, 
which entails that uncorrelated intra-industry shocks becomes more likely. In simple 
terms, diversification increases the probability that a positive shock in one industry offsets 
a negative shock in another industry, resulting in a zero impact on the total export. 
Therefore, a highly-diversified national economy will not have to undergo changes in its 
terms of trade as often as a single-product national economy. So, economies that are 
sufficiently diversified could better tolerate the costs of abandoning their national 
currency.  
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Turning to Fleming (1971), the author argues that integrating economic policies, 
and establishing a common preference on the inflation rate in particular, is an essential 
precondition to form an optimal currency union as it fosters more equilibrated current 
account transactions and reduces the need for nominal exchange rate adjustments. Indeed, 
two countries with a different rate of inflation can only co-exist provided that the country 
with the higher inflation devaluates its currency against the currency of the country with 
lower inflation. Within a monetary union, this is obviously not possible and both countries 
have to accept the centrally preferred rate of inflation. Therefore, having a common 
preference on the targeted inflation rate, and coordinating fiscal and monetary policies in 
accordance, should be mandatory for a solid union.  
In addition, Frankel and Rose (1998) believe that economic integration is an 
endogenous variable. Indeed, according to the authors even if members states are not 
highly integrated with each other at the start of the union, they will end up fulfilling this 
requirement ex post as a result of the expected increase in trade among member countries 
associated with the mere fact of joining a currency union. An opposite view is expressed 
by Krugman (1993), who believes that monetary unions generates specialisation of 
industrial activity therefore reducing economic integration in the region. 
Finally, the last OCA criterion asserts that financial markets should be integrated 
in order to reduce the need for exchange rate adjustments (Ingram, 1962). Indeed, high 
level of financial integration allows to mitigate the effects of asymmetric shocks through 
increased capital flows between surplus and depressed countries. For instance, the latter 
may borrow from surplus areas or reduce their holding in foreign assets until the shock is 
over. Also, with a deep level of financial integration equilibrating capital movements 
across member states makes possible to reduce differences in long-term interest rates, 
therefore facilitating the financing of budget deficits but also improving allocational 
efficiency. Nevertheless, the author underlines that financial integration is not a substitute 
for a real adjustment, as it can only smooth this process.   
 McKinnon (2004) analyses in depth the role of financial integration in the form 
of cross-country asset holding for international risk-sharing. Countries sharing a single 
currency can mitigate the effects of asymmetric shocks by diversifying their income 
sources. Specifically, claiming dividends, interests and rental revenue from other 
countries operates as an income insurance. Such ex ante insurance allows the smoothing 
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of both temporary and permanent shocks as long as output is non perfectly correlated. 
However, there is an important drawback. The poor unemployed citizens that are more in 
need for this insurance are unlikely to hold a consistent amount of foreign assets, therefore 
they will obtain little compensation from this mechanism. Instead, well-to-do citizens 
with large portfolio of assets are likely to obtain most of the transfers.  
To conclude, six criteria have been identified. However, as stressed by Ishiyama 
(1975), the evaluation of an OCA is a complex matter and therefore it should not be based 
only on few static parameters. Indeed, it is in the interest of each country to evaluate in 
detail the specific costs and benefits associated with entering a common currency area. 
The following sections give a more analytical perspective on this trade-off.  
 
1.2 The benefits of a common currency 
Entering a monetary union entails a series of benefits, of different entity and 
consistency. In this section, emphasis will be given to the elimination of transaction costs, 
the increase in price transparency and trade, the reduction in exchange rate volatility, but 
also the benefits of having an international currency and the possibility to import 
macroeconomic stabilisation from low inflation countries.  
Among the many, eliminating the transaction costs of changing one currency into 
another is certainly the most visible gain. These transaction costs represent a considerable 
deadweight loss which is comparable to a tax paid by the consumers to the banking sector. 
For instance, the EC Commission (1990) estimated that the gains from the elimination of 
transaction costs range between 13 billion and 20 billion euros per year, an amount that 
represent the 0.5% of the community GDP. Greater efficiency is also resulting from the 
integration of the payment system, as cross border payments can be handled as smoothly 
as payments within the same country.  
Secondly, the introduction of a common currency has the advantage to increase price 
transparency (De Grauwe, 2018). More precisely, consumers can see prices expressed in 
the same currency unit and thus make better price comparisons, which in turn should 
increase competition and lower the prices. However, the issue is whether this effect is 
strong enough; more recent empirical papers on EMU such as Clementi et al. (2010), do 
not find a price convergence effect after the introduction of the common currency. Indeed, 
exploiting arbitrage opportunities remains prohibitive in large currency unions, as it can 
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be very costly for individual consumers to move form a state to another in order to take 
advantage of price differentials.  
A third aspect concerns exchange rate volatility. Assuming that the world is populated 
by risk-adverse individuals, eliminating the exchange rate risk would increase social 
welfare and economic growth by making future returns more certain (Baldwin, 1989). 
Indeed, volatility in nominal exchange rate creates uncertainty about firms’ future 
revenues, an issue that can hamper economic growth when home and foreign economies 
are highly integrated with each other. Also, large fluctuations in exchange rate can be 
responsible for major asymmetric disturbance instead of being variables that could be 
used to adjust asymmetric shocks.  
Baldwin (1989) demonstrates this conclusion by using the neoclassical growth model 
represented in fig 1.4. The horizontal axis shows the capital stock per worker, the vertical 
axis the output per worker, while the line f(k) is the production function. The equilibrium 
is obtained where the marginal productivity of capital is equal to the interest rate 
individuals use to discount future consumption. This is represented in the graph by the 
point A, where the line rr is tangent to the production function.  
The argument proceeds as follow. It is possible to assume that the elimination of the 
exchange risk reduces the systematic risk in the economy, which in turns leads to a lower 
real interest rate and to a flattening of the rr line. The reason is that as the risk diminishes 
investors will require a lower risk premium. As a result, the equilibrium moves from A 
to B causing both an accumulation of capital and a temporary increase in the growth rates. 
Hence, in this neoclassical model the effect of the monetary union on growth rate is just 
temporary.  
Figure 1.4: Above the graphical representation of the neoclassical model. Below the 
effect of lower risk in the neoclassical model. 
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Source: European Commission (1990) 
 
This model can be extended by introducing the effect of dynamic economies of scale. 
Romer (1986) argues that with a higher capital stock, the productivity of labour increases 
over time due to a learning effect. More specifically, assuming that capital is a public 
good and that the knowledge embedded in new machines is freely available to all workers, 
the rising capital stock determines the accumulation of additional knowledge, which in 
turn fosters labour productivity. Contrary to the static case described previously, this new 
model hypothesises that a lower interest rates – and therefore a monetary union - also 
raises the productivity of the capital stock per worker, leaving the economy on a 
permanently higher growth path. This is shown by the upward movement of the f(k) line 
(see fig 1.5).  
Figure 1.5 Endogenous growth in the ‘new’ growth model.  
 
Source: European Commission (1990) 
Another source of benefits is the affirmation of the common currency as an 
international currency. When countries form a monetary union the new currency that 
12 
 
comes out of these union is likely to weigh more international monetary relations than the 
sum of the individual currencies prior to the union (Taylor and Feenstra, 2017). As a 
result, the new common currency is likely to find increasing use outside the union. The 
advantages of having a currency that is used as medium of exchange in the rest of the 
world are significant. Indeed, the issuer of the international currency will obtain 
additional revenues because of the greater balance sheet, what Mundell (1973) defines as 
seignorage gain. These profits can be used by the government to lower the taxes needed 
to finance government spending and investments. For example, in 1999 more than half of 
the dollars issued by the Federal Reserve where used outside the USA, it follows that the 
Federal Reserve’s potential profits were also more than doubled, totalling up to 0.5% of 
US GDP (De Grauwe, 2016).  
In addition, international currencies are generally held as international reserve by 
foreign central banks, typically in the form of treasury securities rather than cash. For 
instance, the central bank of China holds more than 1 trillion dollars in the form of US 
treasury securities. These holdings have been an important source to finance US budget 
deficits while leaving foreign holders alone in bearing the exchange rate risk 
(Eichengreen, 2012). Also, an international currency also boosts the activity for domestic 
financial markets. Indeed, foreign residents will want to invest in assets and issue debt in 
that currency. This enhances domestic banks ability to attract new businesses and in turn 
creates know how and new jobs. The City of London, a major centre of international 
finance, is a clear example of how a region can benefit from a currency’s international 
vocation. 
Furthermore, monetary union appears to increase trade among member states. Rose 
(2000) found that pairs of countries that are part of monetary unions share trade flows 
among themselves that are 200% higher than those among pairs countries that are not part 
of monetary union. Later on, these trade effects were found to be overestimated, 
especially in the eurozone. Indeed, the euro effect on trade appears to be much more 
modest, as it has been found to range between 5% and 20% (De Nardis and Vicarelli, 
2003; Flam and Nordstrom, 2006). Also, in the absence of a solid theoretical framework 
explaining how monetary union affects trade, estimates of these correlations appeared 
unreliable (Baldwin, 2006). Several studies have attempted to overcome this criticism by 
looking at both sectoral and microeconomic evidence. For instance, Baldwin et al. (2008) 
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argue that the existence of a common currency lowers the fixed and variable costs to 
export, allowing firms that previously only catered domestic markets to start exporting to 
other countries. In the euro area small firms in particular seem to have profited from this 
effect (Nitsch and Pisu, 2008). 
Finally, sharing a common currency with low inflation countries can help high-
inflation countries to introduce macroeconomic stability. In the previous section the 
effectiveness of currency depreciation in adjusting asymmetric shocks and restore 
competitiveness has been addressed several times. However, an analysis by Barro and 
Gordon (1983) suggests that a depreciation is not a flexible instrument which can be used 
frequently, as the knowledge that it may be used again in the future creates strong 
expectational effects on individuals. This in turn ends up fostering inflation. Therefore, 
the use of depreciations can greatly complicate macroeconomic policies as well as 
undermine the credibility of governments in committing to low inflation. In this sense, 
high-inflation countries can benefit from sharing a common currency with low inflation 
countries, as it allows to introduce macroeconomic stability in a short space of time and 
at low costs (at least in the short-term). Indeed, by entering monetary unions high-
inflation countries relinquish the possibility to devalue their currencies and subject their 
economies to the action of a common Central Bank, an institution that must please the 
preferences of all governments, including the low inflation ones. Giavazzi and Pagano 
(1988) address this process as a mean to borrow credibility from foreign governments by 
having ‘monetary hands’ firmly tied. For instance, the authors believe that Italy has made 
use of this mechanism to achieve the same inflation equilibrium of Germany and get rid 
of the double digits inflation rates caused by frequent lira devaluations.  
To conclude, De Grauwe (2018) suggests that the welfare gains from a monetary 
union are directly proportional to the degree of openness of an economy. For example, 
the elimination of transaction costs will weigh more heavily in countries where firms and 
consumers buy and sell a large proportion of goods and services in foreign countries as 
they will be more likely to be subject to decision errors. This relationship is graphically 
depicted in fig 1.6, where the openness of a country is measured by the share of trade as 
percentage of GDP.   
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Figure 1.6 Benefits of monetary union and openness of the country 
 
Source: De Grauwe (2018) 
 
1.3 The costs of a common currency 
The costs of monetary unions have their origins in the loss of monetary independence 
associated with the relinquishment of national currencies. Losing this important 
instrument of economic policy entails that nations taking part to monetary unions will no 
longer be able to determine the national interest rate, to change the quantity of national 
money in circulation, but also to depreciate its currency. As argued in Section 1.1, such 
constraints affect the capacity of national states to deal with asymmetric shocks. 
Nevertheless, the loss of monetary autonomy is also strictly linked with a series of issues 
relating financial markets, debt crisis and expansionary fiscal policy, that will be 
examined in depth in this section.  
To begin with, according to De Grauwe (2011) the entry into a monetary union 
drastically reduces the capacity of governments to finance their budget deficits. The 
author develops the point in the following way. Standalone countries can guarantee bond 
holders that they will be paid out in the national currency when the bonds mature. The 
reason is that there is a national central bank, that will be ready (or be forced) to provide 
liquidity to the government if the latter were to face liquidity problems. On the contrary, 
members of a monetary union cease to issue their debt in their national currencies (over 
which they had full control), and they start to issue debt in a currency over which they 
have no control. Therefore, none of the member countries of a monetary union have the 
power to force the common central bank to provide liquidity in times of crisis. This 
implies that national governments cannot assure the holders of government bonds that 
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they will always be repaid when the bonds come to maturity, thus increasing the risk for 
investors. 
In addition, the fact that governments of a monetary union cannot guarantee the 
intervention of the central bank as lender of last resort gives financial markets the power 
to force default on these countries (Fingleton et al., 2015). To better clarify this point, let 
us suppose investors fear a default by a member state of a monetary union (say Italy), and 
in response to this fear they start selling Italian government bonds, thus driving up the 
interest rate. In that case, the investors who have acquired euros are likely to reinvest the 
money in the European bond market, say in the German BUNDs. Also, there is no foreign 
exchange market and flexible exchange rate, hence Italy is not able to attract new foreign 
investors by cheapening its currency. 
 As a result, the amount of liquidity in Italy shrinks and the Italian government 
experiences a liquidity crisis, meaning it cannot obtain funds to finance its debt at 
reasonable interest rates. In addition, the Italian government cannot force the European 
Central Bank to provide it with the cash to pay out bondholders (namely assume the role 
of lender of last resort) because the government does not control that institution. This may 
in turn spark off a solvency problem: with a higher interest rate the debt burden increases, 
forcing the government to reduce spending and increase taxation. However austerity is 
politically costly, therefore it may lead the government to stop servicing the debt and 
declare a default. Financial markets are aware of this risk and will test the Italian 
government when budget deficits worsen. Thus, in a monetary union, financial markets 
gain enormous power as member countries become vulnerable to movements of distrust 
by investors. De Grauwe and Ji (2013) argue that there is a self-fulfilling prophecy in 
these dynamics. When financial markets start doubting a government's capacity to repay 
its debt, investors sell government securities, increasing the likelihood that the 
government will default on the debt.  
In the light of the above, a fourth important disadvantage of monetary unions is that 
the greater exposure to financial markets’ sentiments exacerbates the effect of asymmetric 
shocks (Beine et al., 2003). Booms and busts are endemic in capitalism because many 
economic decisions depend on future expectations and thus are vulnerable to uncertainty 
and irrationality, the so-called ‘movements in animal spirits’ (Akerlof and Shiller, 2009). 
As long as these movements in animal spirits are aligned between member countries, 
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membership in a monetary union does not aggravate this boom and bust mechanism. 
However, as anticipated before, in the event of both desynchronized business cycles and 
a debt crisis, membership in a monetary union can make these divergences drastically 
wider.  
Let us return to the two-country model presented in section 1.1, where country B is 
hit by an asymmetric demand shock that reduces output and employment. The decline in 
GDP leads to a decline of government tax receipts while the higher level of 
unemployment generates an increase of government expenditures. This in turn causes a 
deterioration of budget deficit, which if too large, can cast doubts on the solvency of the 
government. Distrust leads investors to sell government bonds, causing an increase in the 
interest rate and in turn a further fall in demand due to the higher borrowing costs. 
Conversely, Country A benefits from the sales of Country B’s government bonds, as 
investors will presumably direct their funds towards more trustworthy securities such as 
country A bond (it is currently facing an economic boom). The effect of these purchases 
is to reduce the yield on these bonds, which in turn increase aggregate demand in the 
country. Thus, the debt crisis amplifies both the initial negative demand shock in Country 
B and the economic boom in country A, making the adjustment problem even harder. 
This effect is shown in Fig. 1.7. 
 
Figure 1.7 Amplification of asymmetric shocks in currency unions 
 
Source: De Grauwe (2018) 
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There is a stabilizing effect from exchange rate changes, which is absent when states 
belong to a monetary union. For example, if Country A and Country B were standalone 
countries with their own national currencies, they could have mitigated these destabilizing 
dynamics more easily. Indeed, if during a recession investors start selling Country B 
bonds and switch to Country A bonds, they will necessarily have to go through the foreign 
exchange market, causing in turn the appreciation of currency A and depreciation of 
currency B. The depreciation of currency B tends to boost aggregate demand in country 
B by fostering exports, while the appreciation of currency A tends to reduce aggregate 
demand and inflation in country A.  
Finally, the last criticism treated in this section stresses how monetary unions may 
deprive national governments of another economic policy instrument: the use of 
expansionary fiscal policy to stabilise business cycles (Encinas-Ferrer, 2015). As said 
before, governments that are hit by a liquidity crisis can be forced to apply austerity, 
namely to reduce spending and increase taxes in the middle of a recession in order to fix 
the budget deficit and calm down investors’ fears. However, Keynesian economists have 
always stressed the essential role played by deficit spending in offsetting the effect of a 
GDP contraction as well as limiting its social costs. Not surprisingly, cutting spending 
and hiking taxes generates deeper recession and unemployment, making recovery much 
longer and painful. 
To contrast this criticism Mundell (1973) argues that it helps to have an insurance 
mechanism that allows for income transfers to the country experiencing a negative 
demand shock. In the absence of this instrument, economic adjustments such as wage 
depreciation are needed. Unfortunately, this change in relative price is difficult to achieve 
as workers tend to resist a decline in their real wages (Temin and Vines, 2014). The 
authors argue that in a world in which workers have money illusion, they may resist real 
wage declines obtained by a drop in their nominal wage more forcefully than the same 
real wage decline brought about by price increases (currency depreciations cause 
increases in price of imports). In sum, to the extent that countries face rigidities and have 
poorly organised insurance system, adjustment to recessions becomes harder to achieve, 
making the costs of a monetary union unbearable to member states. 
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Chapter 2: The Eurozone as an optimum currency area: a critical assessment 
2.1 Trade specialisation or further integration? 
Symmetry in business cycles and economic integration are considered to be among 
the most important OCA criteria. Indeed, as stressed in section 1.1, a high level of 
synchronization and economic integration is essential in order to limit the costs of joining 
EMU in terms of both exposure to asymmetric shocks and relinquishing autonomy over 
monetary policy. In addition, these criteria are interrelated with each other, as economic 
integration is supposed to foster more aligned business cycles (Jager and Hafner, 2013). 
Therefore, the evaluation of their joint fulfilment represents a valid starting point for this 
analysis on EMU. 
Before starting to assess these criteria in detail, it is important to stress that 
previous to the introduction of the euro a large literature questioned whether belonging 
to EMU would have made economic integration and business cycle synchronisation more 
likely. On the issue, two contrasting views have emerged: one expressed by Frankel and 
Rose and supported by the European Commission, and the other expressed by Paul 
Krugman. Specifically, Frankel and Rose (1998) argued that the expected increase in 
trade among future EMU member countries would have led to higher synchronisation and 
integration, therefore reducing the exposure to asymmetric shocks. Oppositely, according 
to Krugman (1993) trade integration leads to regional concentration of industrial 
activities, which in turn causes the specialisation of production and generates less 
correlated output fluctuations.  
Examining the first criterion, the literature offers mixed results of EMU’s effect 
on the synchronisation of business cycles, therefore no firm conclusions can be drawn on 
the issue. In particular, pre-crisis literature seems to confirm, although more moderately, 
the positive correlation hypothesised by Frankel and Rose. For instance, Clark and 
Wincoop (2001) and Fidrmuc (2004) find evidence that trade flows positively affect 
output synchronisation across countries and regions, hence supporting the OCA 
endogeneity hypothesis (See section 1.1). Rose (2008) writes again on the topic and finds 
that EMU led to an increase in trade ranging between 8% and 23%, while it is estimated 
that each 1% increase in trade between a pair of countries seems to raise the correlation 
coefficient for their detrended outputs by around .02. 
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Conversely, with the advent of the Global Financial crisis the notion of 
decoupling, namely the desynchronization of cycles, has gained attention. To start with, 
Papageorgiou et al. (2010) argue that Europe tended to converge during the period 1992-
1999, but to diverge from 2000-2009 on, leading to an increasing number of clusters 
within Europe. Interestingly, they point out that crisis periods, such as the sovereign debt 
crisis, can lead to increasing short-term convergence, followed by long-run divergence. 
Along the same lines, Christodoulopoulou (2013) claim that the effect of the common 
currency adoption is negative and significant for two out of the three measures for 
business cycle correlations employed at the current study, while the third measure 
indicates an insignificant effect. The negative result seems to be more in line with 
Krugman’s argument even though the results depend heavily on the assumptions 
underlying the filtering procedure. Additionally, this paper indicates no effect on the 
business cycle correlations only for some of the core group countries (Germany, 
Luxembourg). Spain, Italy and Belgium feature the highest divergence instead. 
Turning to Caporale et al. (2015), they find that output synchronisation decreases 
in relative terms with respect to the euro area in peripheral countries, while it increases in 
the core countries. More specifically, they show that trade intensity has led to higher 
business cycle correlation only among the core countries but not in the case of the 
periphery, which has been testifying a declining effect over time instead (see Figure, 2.1). 
In their view structural factors such as trade specialisation, the lack of flexible exchange 
rates as well as fiscal policy constraints appear to have generated asymmetric responses 
of the core and the periphery to external shocks. Similar results are supported by Belke et 
al. (2017) and Ahmed et al. (2018).  
Figure 2.1: the effect of trade intensity over output synchronisation for EMU’s 
peripheral (dashed line) and core countries (dotted line). 
 
Source: Caporale et al. (2015). 
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Seen on the whole, the empirical results of this strand of the literature can seem 
conflicting. Differences in the results can be partly explained by the myriad of different 
methods to determine the level of business cycle synchronization. Indeed, as Glick and 
Rose (2016) suggest, the observed time window is often set arbitrarily, and the correlation 
coefficients are prone to potential outliers biasing the results. More importantly, the lack 
of a common understanding on the issue symptomizes the absence of a deep and decisive 
economic integration among EMU countries, or at least among core and periphery, as 
structurally similar countries are more prone to have correlated output fluctuations.  
Before the introduction of EMU there was a general consensus among academics 
that future EMU countries lagged behind the United States in terms of regional economic 
integration. For instance, Eichengreen (1991) found evidence for a greater level of 
interregional trade in North America than in Europe, as well as higher correlation of 
shocks. In addition, Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) detected that real exchange rate 
variability was three to four times higher within the EU than within the United States.  
If it is commonly accepted that European countries were not deeply integrated at 
the start of EMU, the question is whether the level of integration improved after the 
introduction of the single currency (the so called ‘endogeneity’ effect hypothesised by 
Rose). What appears from the most recent studies on the topic is that despite the increase 
in intra EMU trade since 1999, European economies are far from getting more integrated 
as they are witnessing a process of economic specialisation, responsible in turn to 
exacerbate structural imbalances among countries. 
Indeed, a report of the ECB edited by Mongelli et al. (2016) clears evidence for 
an increase in specialisation, albeit at different rates, across countries from 1995 up to 
2014. Considering the Industrial sector as benchmark, it appears that Austria, Germany, 
Ireland and Finland managed to maintain an high industry share. Conversely, other 
countries such as Belgium, the Netherlands, France, Spain, Greece, Portugal and 
Luxembourg saw their industrial sector decline. In addition, looking at the variation of 
industry gross value added (GVA) share over time, there is evidence for a drastic increase 
in the dispersion of the figure after the Euro introduction. A trend that highlights the 
underlying EMU effect on the inter-regional concentration of the sector (see figure 2.2A). 
To bring additional evidence to the point, the comparison of the GVA shares of 18 sub-
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sectors of manufacturing for Germany and Portugal (a core and a peripheral country) from 
1995 until the present is illustrated in figure 2.2B.  
 
Figure 2.2: On the left (figure 2.2 A) it is illustrated the evolution of the GVA 
coefficient of variation in the industrial sector over time in EMU countries. On the right 
(figure 2.2 B) it is shown an increase in specialisation in the Motor and Machinery sub-
sectors in Germany, whereas almost every sub sectors aside from food industry has 
decreased in Portugal 
 
Source: Mongelli et al. (2016). 
Similar trends have occurred in other sectors of the economy. For example, the 
financial sector has become increasingly important in Luxembourg (accounting for about 
25% of economic activity) but also in Netherlands, Belgium and Italy. Nevertheless, not 
every industry followed this path, as the construction sector dropped with the crisis, 
witnessing a sort of return to a long-term average among countries. In order to bring 
together such a broad range of information, the Krugman Specialisation Index (KSI) - a 
widely-used specialisation measure - has been considered.  
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The Index is defined as follows:  
                                               
It measures the absolute distance in a sector’s relative importance between the 
country K and the reference group (in this case EA12). Thus, a country which is more 
specialised in selected industries than the reference group will obtain a higher KSI. In 
Table 2.1 below, it is shown the trend in specialisation according to this measure for EA12 
countries from 1995 to 2014. The data reveals a general increase in specialisation but the 
results are mixed. Indeed, a group of countries are becoming increasingly more 
specialised, especially after the financial crisis (e.g. Luxembourg, Netherlands, Ireland, 
Portugal and Greece). Another group, which consists of Austria, Italy, France, Finland 
and Spain, has a stable structure or is getting less specialised.  
 
Table 2.1:  The evolution of the Krugman Specialisation Index 
 in the EA12 over time. 
KSI 
Country 
1995q4 1999q4 2008q4 2014q4 Mean Standard 
deviation 
AUT 14.15 15.60 16.10 15.15 15.25 0.83 
BEL 9.47 9.63 12.58 16.73 12.10 3.40 
DEU 11.12 11.37 15.26 15.06 13.20 2.26 
FIN 19.34 18.76 17.89 14.42 17.60 2.20 
FRA 15.08 13.92 15.54 14.38 14.73 0.72 
NLD 13.33 13.69 12.24 20.31 14.89 3.66 
LUX 47.50 45.03 50.55 47.69 2.76 
IRL 28.81 22.48 31.85 27.71 4.78 
PRT 17.42 18.41 21.48 18.85 19.04 1.73 
ITA 10.76 8.53 7.36 11.54 9.55 1.94 
GRC 32.08 31.98 26.47 37.01 31.88 4.30 
ESP 23.14 22.42 18.32 15.61 19.87 3.55 
Source: Mongelli et al. (2016). 
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Overall, the results are not univocal and therefore it is complex to answer the 
questions raised in this section. Still, it appears that at least at a sectoral level there has 
been an increase in specialisation, which means in turn that EMU is getting further away 
from becoming an OCA.  
2.2 Productivity, Wages and real exchange rate misalignments 
Despite the large evidence considered in the previous section, it could be argued that  
economic integration is a broader concept than the mere specialisation argument. Indeed, 
integrated economies must also show an alignment in fundamentals in order to maintain 
a similar level of competitiveness. Therefore, this section will analyse whether after the 
introduction of the euro there is an increased or reduced convergence in member states’ 
most basics economic indexes. In particular, attention will be given to the evolution of 
productivity, wage inflation, and real exchange rate.  
Starting with labour productivity, it is found that productivity differentials across euro 
area countries have grown larger after the introduction of the single currency. This 
phenomenon is particularly evident between core and peripheral countries (Gamberoni et 
al., 2016). In order to give an insightful view on the issue, in fig 2.3 it has been reported 
the variation in the distribution of labour productivity of Italian, Portuguese, German and 
Austrian firms between 2001 and 2012, developed. Apparently, labour productivity of 
Italian firms in 2012 is more skewed than prior to the crisis, as the peak is higher and the 
mode of the distribution has shifted to the left over time. This shift has been even more 
worrying for Portugal, where a larger number of firms moved to the low productivity 
region, corresponding to an overall decline in productivity across the board. The 
developments in Italy and Portugal juxtapose with the adjustment processes that have 
taken place in Austria or Germany. In these countries, the distribution of labour 
productivity shifted outwards and the skewness reduced, indicating a rise in the number 
of productive firms.  
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Figure 2.3:  Kernel density of labour productivity in firms with more than 20 
employees in Italy, Portugal, Austria and Germany. 
 
Source: Gamberoni et al. (2016) 
One possible explanation for the phenomenon is related to the issue of economic 
specialisation. As stressed before, southern countries are getting increasingly specialised 
in non-tradable sectors (such as construction, hotels and restaurants, business services 
etc), while manufacture is gaining weight in the core. The first suffers of lower 
productivity on average compared to the second, a gap that according to the authors has 
widened over time and could explain this divergence.  
However, this traditional split of the economy may be misleading in describing the 
phenomenon. Indeed, the productivity differences could also be explained by weaker 
resource allocation (Fontagné et al., 2016). CompNet data (undated:online) reveals an 
increase in both labour and capital misallocation in many European countries, with the 
exception of Germany, causing a considerable dispersion of productivity across firms. In 
particular, the cost of credit, demand uncertainty and excessive capital market regulation 
are found to hinder the ability of reallocating capital to most efficient firms (Gilchrist et 
al., 2013). Changes in real turnover and labour market regulation would responsible for 
labour misallocation instead (Haltiwanger et al., 2014). 
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The second parameter that has been analysed is wage inflation. The reason behind its 
inclusion in the analysis is that the synchronization of inflationary pressures is essential 
to maintain stable the relative level of competitiveness among member states of a 
currency union. However, this synchronisation is precisely what is lacking in EMU, 
especially between core and peripheral countries. Indeed, looking at OECD’s data (2018) 
it can be observed that variations in nominal unit labour cost (hereafter NULC inflation) 
positively - and strongly - diverged among peripheral and core countries between 1999 
and 2008, while it negatively diverged between 2010 and 2015. For instance, in the 1999-
2008 period NULC remained stable in Germany and Austria, while it rose by almost 30% 
in Portugal and about 36-49% in Greece, Ireland, and Spain. This process is also well 
stressed in table 2.2, which shows a huge variance in NULC inflation among countries 
(±13.8 percentage points). Conversely, in the so-called ‘Troika countries’,  between 2010 
and 2015 NULC fell by around 12% in Greece, 6–7% in Spain, and 6% in Portugal 
(Eurostat, 2018). 
 
Table 2.2: Overview of selected variables regarding labour costs 
and inflation in the EA 12. 
Source: Höpner and Lutter (2017). 
 
Analysing these divergences between 1999 and 2008, Höpner and Lutter (2017) find 
that differences in NULC inflations among EMU countries depend on the heterogeneity 
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of the wage bargaining regimes. In particular, it is found that wage inflations are higher 
when the wage-bargaining regimes lack of a central coordination. Indeed, if wage 
bargaining takes place in a decentralized and uncoordinated manner, then the single units 
will compete on short term objectives such as pay rises, causing inflationary pressures on 
nominal wages (Bruno and Sachs, 1985). On the contrary, if wage bargaining is 
coordinated, uncertainty about the wage deals of other units disappears and forms of 
strategic cooperation such as strategic wage restraint can be encouraged (Bruno and 
Sachs, 1985). The latter strategy has the advantage to reduce export prices, and therefore 
to generate trade surpluses, support export-sector job security, and perhaps establish a 
basis for higher wages in the future. These two systems of wage bargaining may be 
referred to respectively as Southern and Northern-style wage bargaining, with the latter 
approach usually seen as more provident and long term based. Höpner and Lutter (2017) 
believe that this heterogeneity of wage regimes between peripheral and core countries 
could hamper a smooth functioning of the euro, and therefore greater integration is 
advisable.  
Nevertheless, today any hypothesis about the transfer of Northern-style wage 
coordination to the South appears unrealistic, since the interventions by the former Troika 
pushed Southern wage bargaining in precisely the opposite direction. Indeed, as 
documented by Natali and Vanhercke (2013), these interventions aimed at weakening 
centralised trade unions and at strengthening company-based wage bargaining in order to 
reduce real wages in times of crisis. This change in institutions helps to explain the trend 
reversal on NULC occurred in peripheral countries since 2010. Paradoxically, therefore, 
the European Commission interventions pushed the Eurozone even further away from the 
condition of homogeneity necessary to make EMU an optimum currency area.  
The heterogeneity of European labor relations - and therefore wage inflations - had a 
significant impact on the third parameter examined in this section: the fluctuations in real 
exchange rates (RER). In a work by Solanes et al. (2017), it is stressed how RER 
misalignments between core and periphery has been an evident issue in the past decades. 
As detailed in Chapter 1, this an extremely important matter as the adjustments to RER 
overvaluations in a fixed exchange rate regime entail greater economic and social 
sacrifices compared to when the exchange rate is let free to float.  The inspection of fig. 
2.4, which shows the fluctuations of RER in four southern countries between 1970 to 
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2011, allows to further appreciate the magnitude of the problem. The average size of RER 
misalignments is remarkable in each country, ranging between 10% and −13% for 
Greece, between 25% and −31% for Italy, between 16% and −13% for Portugal, and 
between 25% and −20% for Spain.  
 
Figure 1.4: RER misalignment in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain (per unit values) 
with respect to the rest of the world. 
 
Source: Solanes et al. (2017) 
Additionally, Solanes et al. (2017) find that the variance of the annual RER 
misalignments and the frequency of RER overvaluations of each peripheral country 
increased after the introduction of the EMS and worsened with the euro. This indicates 
that the need to modify the NER in each country escalated after fixing the exchange rate 
(and particularly after the introduction of the euro). For example, a Goldman Sachs study 
indicated that the German economy needed a revaluation of about 25% and the 
Portuguese economy a devaluation of about 35%, with all other euro members positioned 
in between these two extremes (Goldman Sachs, 2013). As alternative, Krugman (2011) 
suggests that Germany should inflate labour costs in order to free the Southern European 
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countries from some of the pressure to deflate labour costs, an event that is unlikely to 
happen. 
  In sum, it appears as peripheral countries have suffered of a major misalignment 
from core countries after the decision to enter EMU rather than witnessing greater 
economic integration. In an interesting contribution, Batavia and Nandakumar (2016) 
give a theoretical framework to the issue and argue that the abovementioned poor 
performance of the peripheral nations could be traced back to the ‘Dutch Disease’ 
phenomenon. With the term ‘Dutch disease’ economists usually refer to the process of 
‘deindustrialization’ in resource rich countries, a phenomenon stemmed by a large flow 
of FDIs in the non-traded sector, which in turn causes real appreciation and hampers 
manufacturing. Similarly, in the pre-crisis years current account surpluses in the core 
nations were mirrored with large capital flows to the peripheral nations, where much of 
these flows were into non-tradable activities like construction (especially in Ireland and 
Spain) rather than in highly productive and competitive sectors. Income transfers from 
abroad increased domestic spending and drove up the prices of services and nontraded 
goods. The higher prices caused wage increases also in the traded sector and made 
manufacturing non-profitable, leading in turn to a contraction of manufacturing as well 
as to the specialisation of peripheral countries in the non-traded sector (the so called 
‘deindustrialisation’). It can be seen from table 2.3 that manufactory has, indeed, declined 
sharply in the PIGS nations after the entry into EMU.  
 
                    Table 2.3: Share of manufacture in total exports. 
 2001 2011 
Greece 50% 38% 
Ireland 86% 85% 
Portugal 85% 75% 
Spain 78% 70% 
Germany 83% 84% 
Holland 59% 64% 
 (Source: Batavia and Nandakumar, 2016) 
However, on the macroeconomic level is not all doom and gloom, and there are also 
some signs of convergence. For instance, Bulligan and Viviano (2017) find evidence that 
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the negative relationship between price inflation and economic slack - the wage Phillips 
curve- has changed since the advent of the great financial crisis and become more similar 
across European nations. In particular, they discover an increased correlation between 
wages and the unemployment rate in Italy, France and Spain, while such correlation has 
reduced to the European average in Germany (see figure 2.5). Therefore, it can be said 
that wage flexibility, which is also one of Mundell criteria, is increasing and converging 
in the Eurozone. This is coherent with the findings of Adamopoulou et al. (2016), who 
argue that after 2008 Italian firms used fixed-term workers to slow down salary dynamics. 
But also with the work of Font et al. (2015), that show how in Spain real wages of newly 
hired workers and temporary workers are more sensitive to the business cycle, as there is 
an increasing use of flexible wage schemes.  
 
Figure 2.5: Philips curve steepness parameter in the private sectors in four 
European countries. 
 
(Source: Bulligan and Viviano, 2017) 
2.3 The Maastricht Treaty and the need for fiscal transfers in the Eurozone 
The Maastricht Treaty laid the foundations for the creation of the single currency and 
significantly expanded cooperation between European countries. Along with setting out 
the timeline for the introduction of the single currency, the Treaty also established a set 
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of ‘convergence criteria’ that specified the conditions under which a member would 
qualify for participation in the common currency. These conditionalities were formulated 
as follows. First, the inflation rate must be no more than 1.5% higher than the average of 
the three lowest inflation rates among EU member states. Second, the long-term interest 
rate must be no more than 2% higher than the average observed in these three low inflation 
countries. Third, joining the European Monetary System is an essential precondition. 
Fourth, government deficit should not be higher than 3% of its GDP. Fifth, government 
debt should not exceed 60% of GDP, and if it does it should diminish sufficiently and 
approach the reference value.   
Formally, the purpose of these criteria was to ensure a convergence of candidate 
countries’ economies. However, the OCA theory, which is discussed in Chapter 1, never 
stressed the need for so much macroeconomic convergence as condition for a successful 
monetary union. Heipertz and Verdun (2004) argue that these requirements should be 
interpreted as a self-imposed suffering demanded by Germany in order to have evidence 
that southern were serious about fighting inflation. 
 This rigidity in implementing budget austerity was also reflected in the Stability 
and Growth Pact (SGP), which establishes a complex system of rules that should guide 
national budgetary policy after the start of EMU (in particular the 3% deficit and 60% 
debt norms). The problem with austerity is that a strict application of SGP rules risks to 
hamper the capacity of national budgets to function as automatic stabilizers, thereby 
intensifying recessions (Eichengreen et al., 2005; Eyraud et al., 2017). This is particularly 
true in currency unions, where in the absence of the exchange rate instrument national 
government budgets remain the only available mean to contrast asymmetric shocks. On 
the other hand, these rules help to avoid that unsustainable debt and deficits may cause 
undue pressure on the BCE, as in monetary unions liquidity crisis can easily degenerate 
into solvency crisis (McKinnon, 1996). Still, De Grauwe (2018) observes that the lack of 
flexibility of national budgetary policies in the EMU creates risks that may be larger than 
the risk of default (De Grauwe, 2018). The author also concludes that to enhance the 
sustainability of both the SGP and EMU it is important to have a central budget that 
enables to redistribute income among states in the event of regional shocks.  
The previous point is supported by additional arguments. Firstly, in a world where 
market imperfections prevent risk-averse individuals from buying optimal levels of 
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insurance, fiscal transfers play an essential role in stabilising business cycles (Mundell, 
1973). A second argument is that highly indebted countries may be constrained by market 
fears in conducting anticyclical fiscal policy, an issue that could determine the inability 
of these countries to deal with economic crisis and thus challenging the integrity of the 
single currency (Berger et al., 2018). Thus, a degree of debt mutualisation or financial 
risk sharing could, in theory, helps to lower borrowing costs amongst the periphery 
member states and helps to take off pressure from the financial markets (Warren, 2017). 
 For example, during the financial crisis Florida’s economy was severely hit by the 
bust of the housing bubble. In 2010 the state received $40 billion – 5% of Florida’s GDP 
- in de facto transfers from the federal government, which helped the economy to recover 
(Krugman, 2012). The crucial point is that the federal government did not face a 
borrowing constraint and therefore it had very low borrowing costs. Conversely, 
financing the significant budget deficit would have been a burden if Florida was a 
sovereign state.  
In principle, the same reasoning could be applied to EU budget, but, given its small 
size, its impact in term of risk sharing is almost non-existent. Indeed, at about 1 percent 
of GDP, it offsets less than 1cent for every €1 of a nation’s GDP decline, an order of 
magnitude which is smaller than central budgets even in the most decentralized 
federations (O'Rourke and Taylor, 2013). Considering other two federations as 
benchmark, net fiscal transfers help smooth about 10–15 percent of idiosyncratic income 
shocks at the state level in the United States and about 20 percent at the Land level in 
Germany instead (Cottarelli and Guerguil, 2014). To explain this divergence, it is 
sufficient to note that the federal states in US and German Lands are part of a political 
union which has the power to enforce these transfers, whereas the same cannot be said of 
EMU. 
The limitations of the combined application of the SGP and EU small common budget 
became evident as the eurozone crisis unfolded: the rigid observance of deficit rules 
coupled with insufficient fiscal transfers ended up intensifying the recession in southern 
countries rather than smoothing it (Warren, 2017). Indeed, at the beginning of the crisis 
European leaders, and Germany in particularly, argued that the troubles in the sovereign 
debt market had been caused by excessive government spending by certain periphery 
member states. As a result, in the following years the framing of policy solutions in 
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response to the crisis was guided by a neoliberal ideology which involved the intransigent 
application of SGP’s fiscal discipline. These policies exacerbated the depression, making 
it necessary for the ECB to fulfil its function as lender of last resort in response to the 
escalating crisis in the eurozone (De Grauwe, 2013).  
With the ECB able to temporarily normalise market reactions within the eurozone, 
many European leaders considered to reframe the crisis as demanding more supranational 
solutions. Despite these developments, when discussing the reform solutions there was 
limited ambition shown in framing supranational solutions to the eurozone crisis. Indeed, 
Germany made it clear that reforms should not lead to permanent transfers between 
countries and that efforts should be made to guarantee they are consistent with the existing 
EU fiscal framework (European Commission, 2015). A key constraining factor were the 
sovereignty concerns and issues of moral hazard circulating amongst member states, 
which together have ensured that a supranational fiscal policy is unlikely to be obtained 
in Europe (Warren, 2017). Therefore, since there is no concrete prospects for a political 
union in Europe any time soon, it appears as this OCA criteria will remain unfulfilled.  
Nevertheless, the institutional framework has evolved in the past few years, paving 
the way for new developments on the topic. Indeed, the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM) added a conditional lending facility available to all members that enables to extend 
credit when market access is in doubt and sovereign lending rates are high. However, 
ESM credit is subject to strict conditionalities and it ultimately must be repaid, therefore 
reducing its macroeconomic impact and leaving fiscal risk sharing to insufficient levels 
(Berger et al., 2018).  
 
2.4 EMU and financial market integration 
As stressed in section 1.1, financial market integration is an additional important 
requirement to become an optimum currency area. Financial and economic integration 
are expected to be an interrelated phenomenon as financial market fluctuations reflect the 
expectations about future real economic activity, but also the real economy can be 
destabilized by swings in financial markets. Therefore, giving the scarce economic 
integration discussed in section 2.1 and 2.2, one may expect a low level of financial 
integration too. Interestingly, most studies seem to agree that European financial markets 
are getting more synchronized than real markets instead.  
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For instance, Ahmed et al. (2018) find a positive and significant euro dummy, giving 
indication of increase in financial synchronization in the eurozone after 2002 (except for 
Portougal which decouples from the four major economies). Likewise, Walti (2011) 
stresses that monetary integration has raised financial returns’ correlations by reducing 
transaction costs coming from exchange rate uncertainty, implementing a common 
monetary policy and converging inflation expectations. Furthermore, Beine and Candelon 
(2011) find again a strong support in favour of a positive impact of trade and financial 
liberalisation reforms on the degree of cross-country stock market linkages. Therefore, 
the existence of the euro had the effect of speeding up financial market integration in 
Europe. The main reason behind this phenomenon is that the elimination of the exchange 
risk also eliminates an obstacle to the free flow of financial assets and services. 
On the other hand, it is argued that the complete integration of financial markets has 
still to be achieved as important differences in the legal system creates obstacles to the 
fulfilment of this criterion (Fidora et al., 2006). Indeed, accounting rules, corporate 
taxation, shareholders’ rights, and laws governing takeovers continue to be very different 
across countries in the eurozone, creating divergences in the value of bonds and equity 
across EMU. Still, there is evidence that the introduction of the euro contributed to reduce 
this home bias within the Eurozone (Fidora et al., 2006).   
Importantly, the role of international capital transactions during the financial and 
sovereign debt crises in the EU has given reasons to question the effectiveness of financial 
integration. Cesaroni and De Santis (2018) analyse the composition and institutional 
quality of international holdings in emu countries before and after the euro in order to 
evaluate whether this integration occurred. Surprisingly, they find that after EMU 
differences in the form of financing among member states got wider: in most of core 
countries there was an increase of sources of less volatile financing, while in the 
peripheral countries on average the opposite occurred.  
Specifically, they focus on three main international transactions components: Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI), Portfolio Debt Investment (PDI) and Portfolio Equity 
Investment (PEI) over the years 1996-2014. The empirical evidence shows that the ratio 
of net FDIs asset to GDP increased in core countries and remained stable in periphery 
countries, while the ratio of net PEIs asset to GDP increased in core and decreased in 
some periphery countries. Concerning PDI, the ratio of net PDIs asset decrease extremely 
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sharply in periphery countries, meaning that there was a strong inflow of foreign capitals 
in the latter group.  
The problem with this trend is that while PEIs are considered to be a more stable and 
growth-friendly source of financing, portfolio debt investments increase the risk of 
banking and balance of payments crises (Furceri et al., 2011). This is precisely what 
occurred in many peripheral countries with the worsening of the financial and debt crisis. 
Indeed, when investors pulled out from the domestic bond markets because of the diffuse 
default fears, the price of government bonds drastically decreased. As a result, domestic 
banks – that are usually the main investors in the national bonds market – registered 
significant losses in their balance sheet. This process increased capital outflows, which in 
turn determined a liquidity crisis in the banking sector. 
 Such outflows are more likely to occur in a currency union as there is no risk of 
exchange rate depreciation and free movement of capital is allowed. De Grauwe (2018) 
argues that a banking union is therefore necessary in order to cut the ‘deadly embrace’ 
between national debt and banks that has been stressed before. This issue will be better 
analysed in Chapter 3.   
 
2.5 Current trends in intra EU migration 
From the perspective of the optimal currency area literature, labour mobility is another 
essential instrument to mitigate the effect of economic divergences between member 
countries. However, in the euro area the level of interregional labour mobility remains 
low, especially if compared to the USA (Taylor and Feenstra, 2017). For example, in 
2013 less than 5% of EU citizens lived in a different Member State than they were born, 
while the same statistic accounts for more than 25% in the US (Arpaia et al. 2016). Yet, 
since the adoption of the Schengen Agreement - which allows free movement of people 
- mobility across the EU has been increasing and migration flows became more 
responsive to economic differences across Member States of the euro area.  
In particular, Arpaia et al. (2018) find that differences in the unemployment rates 
between the country of origin and destination have a significant effect on migration flows 
in the euro area. Specifically, it is found that a 10% increase in the relative unemployment 
rate is associated with a 1.5% fall in the bilateral migration flow. Secondly, the paper 
finds that after the introduction of the euro the responsiveness to changes in 
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unemployment rates has increased. Indeed, it is estimated that in the “old” EU members 
the effect of changes in unemployment rate on migration is about 50% higher in the EMU-
period (after 1999). Thirdly, it is found evidence that EU accession has increased intra 
EU migration by 10% (the figure increases to above 40% with dyadic controls), and there 
is a further increase when labour market restrictions are lifted.  
The increased intra-EU mobility proves that there is a gradual deepening of the labour 
market integration among “old” EU member States that form the euro area. Indeed, 
according to a European Commission report (2017) there is a slightly larger proportion 
of active movers in the period 2011- 2016 than those who moved between 2006 and 2011, 
a result that is consistent with the findings in the literature. In particular, the report finds 
that Germany, which is the main destination country hosting almost 50% of all movers, 
is witnessing a growing number of movers as in 2016 the country has recorded a positive 
intra EU migration amounting to almost 800,000 individuals. Seemingly, Austria is facing 
similar trends as it is the second largest net receiving country in EMU. Turning to the 
countries of departure, Italy, Poland, Romania and Portugual are the main groups of 
movers, each of these groups has become larger since 2015 with the exception of 
Portugual. Not surprisingly, since the beginning of the economic crisis (2009), an 
increasing number of nationals have been leaving Spain and Italy every year and this 
trend continued in 2016.  
Nevertheless, the report also indicates that a common language is still an important 
driver for cross-border migration and that language obstacles may overshadow economic 
opportunities of different labour markets in cross-border areas. For instance, the similarity 
of the Czech and Slovak languages and the same cultural heritage that the two countries 
share could explain why the number of Slovak cross-border workers to the neighbouring 
Czech regions increased, whereas the number of Slovak cross-border to the neighbouring 
Austrian region decreased despite these Austrian regions had higher GDP per capita and 
lower unemployment. Therefore, language and cultural barriers still represent an obstacle 
to factor mobility in Europe.  
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Chapter 3: Future scenarios and possible developments 
 
3.1 Five reforms to complete the monetary union 
The previous chapter has stressed the inadequacies of EMU in respect to the 
fulfilment of the most important OCA criteria. In order to better meet these requirements 
and overcome the fragilities of an incomplete monetary union, member states should 
agree to implement an ambitious set of policies. In particular, this section will give 
emphasis to five reforms: the assumption of the role of lender of last resort by the ECB, 
the implementation of fiscal transfers among member states, the issuing of eurobonds, 
but also the realisation of a banking union and the remodulation of Maastricht parameters. 
Starting with the reform of the ECB, the central bank should serve as lender of last 
resort, that is to say it should guarantee the pay-out of member states’ national debt in the 
event of financial distress (De Grauwe, 2013b). This function is a typical prerogative of 
most central banks, and it is essential to minimize the threat of liquidity crisis and reduce 
asymmetric shocks among member countries (Hu, 2014). Indeed, with the 
implementation of a lender of last resort facility, the ECB would be able to provide the 
necessary liquidity to national governments when the interest rate required by investors 
to hold national bonds becomes excessively costly due to fear over governments’ 
solvency (Garcia-de-Andoain et al., 2016). This type of actions reduces the costs of 
financing national debt, diminishes the likeliness of a sovereign default, as well as 
enhances member countries’ ability to provide anticyclical fiscal policy during times of 
crisis (Hu, 2014). Additionally, its mere introduction has a positive endogenous effect: 
the confidence that the ECB would exercise this function if needed usually prevents 
bondholders from panicking over budget deterioration, so that the central bank would 
have rarely to step in to provide cash to the government (Saka et al., 2015). On the other 
hand, a popular argument against this reform is that it would lead to inflation (Antinolfi 
et al., 2001). Indeed, by buying government bonds the ECB could end up to excessively 
increases the money stock, thereby causing inflationary pressures. For this reason, its 
implementation has been harshly opposed by core countries. 
Despite the objections, in 2012 the ECB partially recognised the need to assume the 
role of lender of last resort and introduced the ‘Outright Monetary Transactions’ program 
(Febrero et al., 2015). With this program, the institution committed itself to buy an 
unlimited amount of governments bonds in the secondary bond market once a Eurozone 
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government asks for financial assistance. The program was quite a success, but 
unfortunately a number of conditions were attached in order for a state to benefit of the 
central bank’s intervention, therefore limiting its effects (De Grauwe, 2018). First, 
governments that apply for OMT support must accept an austerity program imposed by 
the European Stability Mechanism. As stated in section 2.3, austerity has the effect to 
push the already troubled countries into deeper recession, an issue which in turn extends 
desynchronised shocks in EMU rather than diminishing them (Fitoussi and Saraceno, 
2013). Second, the ECB has restricted its purchase to bond with a maturity of up to three 
years. This condition creates the incentive to issue bonds with shorter maturity, thus 
increasing the fragility of the assisted country’s financial system (De Grauwe, 2018). In 
sum, some progress has been achieved but restrictions over the application of this function 
makes the reform just partially developed. Hence, greater power should be given to the 
ECB in order to help member countries smoothing divergences in business cycles 
(Rodríguez and Carrasco, 2016). 
Another important reform concerns the introduction of fiscal transfers among 
member states, a key measure to increase economic integration, reduce asymmetries and 
soften competitiveness imbalances (see section 1.1). Depending on the desired level of 
supranational integration, fiscal transfers could be set up in different forms. In particular, 
this section will analyse the concept of a common unemployment insurance system as 
well as the more ambitious prospect of a federal budget. 
Talking about the first, Van Rompuy et al. (2012) suggest a mechanism in which 
countries experiencing a boom transfer resources to country experiencing a recession, 
with the level of contribution depending on divergences in labour market developments. 
The policy would work like a sort of insurance, which helps both reducing the pain of 
recessions in countries witnessing excessive levels of unemployment and fostering 
integration among member states. On the other hand it has some limitations, as problems 
may arise when national states are all affected by a recession of different amplitudes 
rather than facing a ‘boom and bust’ scenario (Andor, 2016). In this case, countries 
experiencing a mild recession would struggle to transfer resources to more troubled 
countries, since they would end up worsening their economic situation in the midst of a 
crisis. This issue could be overcome with the implementation of the second option: the 
institution of a large central budget. Indeed, a federal budget would allow the use of deficit 
39 
 
spending in times of crises, therefore avoiding fiscal transfers when all members are 
struggling with a serious economic situation (Vandenbroucke et al., 2017). However, it 
is clear that a budgetary union is probably a too ambitious project at the moment, as it 
would entail a European government and parliament (Costa Cabral, 2016). Still, it is 
possibly the future direction Europe will have to take in order to make EMU more resilient 
to external and internal imbalances. 
The symmetrical consequence to the introduction of a common budget is the joint 
issue of common bonds (also known as eurobonds) needed for financing it. A European 
safe asset would be an essential instrument to sustain financial stability, promote 
economic integration, and reduce uncertainty in the economy. As regards the first point, 
greater financial stability stems from the fact that issuing eurobonds implies the existence 
of a central authority with the power to both issue debt and control the currency under 
which the debt is issued (European Commission, 2017b). This alignment of power is a 
missing element in EMU, and its restoration would enable European institutions to 
contrast destabilizing capital flows on the bond market with the use of monetary policy 
(Favero and Missale, 2012).  
Turning to economic integration, eurobonds would foster the homogeneity of 
European economies by increasing diversification of risk and putting an end to the 
banking system’s ‘home country bias’, namely the tendency to overinvest in domestic 
national bonds (Demary and Matthes, 2017). The ‘home country bias’ is responsible for 
transmitting the risk of sovereigns to the banking system, thus hindering banks’ ability to 
lend money and serve the economy in the more vulnerable regions of the Union (Battistini 
et al., 2014). By reducing this exposure, a European safe asset would allow a more even 
distribution of risk as well as a greater integration of eurozone’ economies (Demary and 
Matthes, 2017). Finally, issuing eurobonds would signal the commitment of member 
states to the success of the common currency and in turn reduce economic uncertainty on 
the future of EMU (Juncker and Tremonti, 2010). 
In recent years, several proposals have been put forward with different design 
features, ranging from full to partial common issuance, some based on a two-tranches 
system (blue and red bonds) and others entailing entrance fees. Despite the variety of 
alternatives, these proposals have always been rejected. The issue is that developing 
eurobonds would require the at least partial consolidation of national debts into one 
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federal debt, a condition which exposes the most disciplined countries in the eurozone to 
the moral hazard of southern countries (see section 3.2 for a more in-depth analysis) 
(Matthijs and McNamara, 2015). A second problem is that countries as Germany and 
Netherlands profit from triple A ratings, so joining a common bond mechanism with the 
highly indebted southern countries would cause them to pay an higher interest rate on 
their debt. Therefore, there is little chance to see the realisation of this reform in the near 
future, unless European institutions create a proposal which is sufficiently attractive for 
triple A countries. 
A fourth necessary reform is the implementation of the so called ‘banking union’, 
namely a system that makes it possible to spread the costs of recapitalizing and 
restructuring insolvent banks over the whole union (Abascal et al., 2015). This 
mechanism would have both the effect to smooth divergences in business cycles and 
increase economic integration in the financial sector (Leblond, 2014). To better 
contextualise this assertion, it should be considered that today the resolution of banking 
crisis is a task which is currently carried out by national governments.  
The issue with a decentralised approach, is that banking crisis can turn out as 
extremely expensive, and standalone countries may need to drastically increase their 
budget deficit in order to face bank bailouts’ costs (Belke and Gros, 2016). As a result, in 
the context of EMU where the central bank does not act as lender of last resort and the 
exchange rate instrument is not available, the deteriorated budget deficit can easily trigger 
a financial crisis, foster a recession, and consequently increase the chances of a default 
(see section 1.3). This in turn creates asynchronies in business cycles and determines 
conflicting needs in terms of monetary policies among regions. For example, what 
happened in Ireland with the outbreak of the great financial crisis in 2008 can be easily 
reconducted to the above-mentioned process, and largely diverges from the experience of 
Nevada, which is part of the US banking union (see table 3.1) (Belke and Gros, 2016). 
Table 3.1: Comparison between Ireland and Nevada on the effect of 2008 banking 
crisis on macroeconomic fundamentals. 
 Ireland Nevada 
GDP (in billion ($), 2011) 200 120 
Change in GDP (2007-10) -5.3% -17.6% 
Unemployment rate (2011) 13.5% 14.4% 
Source: Belke and Gros (2016).  
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Figure 3.1: Comparison between Ireland and Nevada on the effect of 2008 
banking crisis on the debt to GDP ratio.  
 
Source: Belke and Gros (2016). 
 
Instead, realising a banking union could prevent this painful scenario as it would 
work as an insurance system: every member country gives a contribution to alleviate the 
bailout costs of another member, and in turn it will receive support in the future when hit 
by a banking crisis. In this way, the resulting deficit remains of moderate entity, financial 
crises are avoided, and convergence in members’ economies is restored (Belke and Gros, 
2016). A second benefit is that a banking union requires a centralised authority which 
supervises the conduct of financial institution, a feature that could help making member 
countries’ financial sector more similar and therefore improving the level of economic 
integration (Capriglione, 2013). 
Unlike other reforms analysed in this section, some steps have already been taken 
towards its implementation. In 2013 the Eurozone agreed to set up a common fund to 
alleviate single member states from the burden of banking crisis, what has been called the 
“single resolution mechanism” (SRM). However, this fund is generally criticised as 
insufficient, since it is relatively small (around 50€ billion) and rules governing its use 
reach a level of complexity that undermines its effectiveness (Alexander, 2015). Indeed, 
the European Commission (2017b) is planning to reinforce the SRM with a ‘common 
fiscal backstop’ and a common deposit insurance. In their view, the SRM and the 
insurance on deposits should be entirely pre-financed by the banking sector, while a fiscal 
backstop provided by member states would be made available only in the event that 
serious problems affects several banks at the same time, determining in turn a financing 
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need which is greater of the means available in the funds. These concessions would be 
paired with a strengthening of the ECB role in supervising the banking sector in the 
eurozone, which will be able to audit financial institutions’ balance sheets, impose fines 
and close down banks if necessary. Considering the theoretical principles examined 
before, such reforms would go in the right direction, however it is too early to draw 
conclusions as their actual implementation may face resistance from member countries. 
Finally, a revision of Maastricht’s parameters and the Stability and Growth Pact 
should be considered. As stated in section 2.3, the SGP strongly limits the possibility of 
member states to contrast shocks through fiscal policy, therefore exacerbating depression 
in EMU countries. Also, it has the effect to reduce the level of public investments in 
countries that are required to lower their debt to GDP ratio (Balassone and Franco, 2000). 
An issue that hinders them from updating their capital stock and in turn sustaining the 
relative level of competitiveness with other member countries, therefore decreasing the 
degree of economic integration in EMU (Laski and Podkaminer, 2012). 
If there is a general accordance in changing the SGP, there are conflicting views on 
how to change it. In a survey edited by Fischer et al. (2006), a vast number of academics 
seem to agree that the SGP should focus more on fostering economic growth rather than 
imposing fiscal discipline. In particular, it is argued that fiscal rules should be applied in 
a long-term perspective instead of imposing rigid yearly-deficit targets. For instance, 
Fitoussi (2002) claims that fiscal parameters should reflect country-specific economic 
conditions, while Teglio et al. (2017) stress the need to allow greater fiscal relaxation in 
bad times. Oppositely, a second branch of literature sees the failure of the SGP as a result 
of excessive flexibility, and thus supports stricter rules. For example, Eichengreen and 
Wyplosz (2003) propose to strengthen fiscal discipline by extending the SGP with rules 
assessing the quality of fiscal policies, whereas Fourçans and Warin (2007) assert that the 
SGP does not prevent countries from engaging in moral hazard, thus the dissuasive 
element should be intensified. 
Furthermore, some authors suggest the introduction of alternative, non-fiscal, 
parameters. In this sense, Laski and Podkaminer (2012) support the inclusion of 
‘excessive external surplus’ procedures against countries generating large current 
accounts surpluses at the expense of domestic consumption and partners’ debts. Such 
procedures would be helpful to avoid that countries as Germany run extensive balance of 
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payments surpluses by reducing unit labour costs and financing deficit countries, a 
process that consequently exacerbates imbalances among members (Laski and 
Podkaminer, 2012). To conclude, despite a general awareness on the limits of the SGP, 
there is not a unanimous consensus on how to amend it. Further considerations on the 
reasons behind member countries’ resistance to this whole set of policies will be 
examined in the following section. 
 
3.2 Limits to further integration 
The aforementioned reforms are undoubtedly necessary to create a more functional 
currency union. However, in the current context, serious limitations appear to constraint 
their effective implementation, a deadlock which is leaving EMU in a counterproductive 
status quo. Such limitations include the risk of moral hazard, the threat of rising inflation, 
and the lack of political support for a deeper integration. 
Starting with the risk of moral hazard, core countries are concerned that peripheral 
countries could use these reforms to issue too much debt while dumping the costs of their 
political short-termism on them (Hebous and Weichenrieder, 2016). This is a classical 
free riding issue. Indeed, the issuance of eurobonds may reduce the incentive to engage 
in sound economic policies at national level, as singular member states could be tempted 
to rely on other countries to repay their liabilities (Muellbauer, 2013). This creates a 
general resistance on countries that behave responsibly. Similarly, by providing a lender 
of last resort facility there is the risk member countries would issue more debt than 
necessary as a result of the reduced power of market forces to constrain government 
spending (Wilsher, 2013). Also, the remodulation of the fiscal rules expressed in the SGP 
could be seen as a way to eliminate those safeguards that prevent moral hazard from 
occurring. 
For these reasons, creditor states as Germany are unwilling to implement a transfer-
union, as they fear that EMU could turn into a currency union of moral hazards (Dyson, 
2012). This climate of distrust was also exacerbated by the recent crisis in the euro area, 
which evidenced reliability issues with southern countries and strengthened the concerns 
that closer ties with the Periphery could undermine the Core’s creditworthiness (Wulff, 
2011). Therefore, in order to achieve such reforms, highly indebted countries need to 
provide further assurance of their good faith and show commitment to the common 
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interest. For instance, they could subject their fiscal policies to tighter supranational 
control (i.e. the European Commission), a requirement that may however lack of political 
support at home. 
Turning to the second limitation, these reforms might cause a boost in inflation. 
According to the neoliberal economics, the excessive increase in money stock possibly 
associated with a lender of last resort facility, and the risk of uncontrolled deficit spending 
entailed with relaxed fiscal rules, can elicit high inflation rates. This consequence is 
particularly feared by Germany, whose longstanding monetarist tradition remains highly 
influential in European policy making. In addition, the existence of state support in 
protecting the banking sector and the sovereign bond market from defaults, would cause 
investors to under-price risks and in turn foster inflationary bubbles (Wilsher, 2013). 
Indeed, the aforementioned mispricing would determine resource misallocation and alter 
economic expectations. A toxic combination, which is responsible for booms and busts 
in the economy as well as for imbalances among member states (Knütter and Wagner, 
2011). 
In reality, despite the outstanding increase of the monetary base resulting from the 
ECB’s quantitative easing, the Eurozone has been far from witnessing a double digit 
inflation. Indeed, EMU is still fighting against the threat of stagnation and deflation 
(Semmler and Haider, 2016). According to Krugman (2010) and Saraceno (2016), this is 
because European countries are caught in a liquidity trap: the increase in the monetary 
base has been paired with a drop of the money multiplier due to fears over member states’ 
precarious economic conditions (the so-called credit crunch). Given that the second effect 
offsets the first, the monetary stock results unchanged (De Grauwe, 2018). Therefore, in 
this economic context, fiscal expansion would enable to restore confidence in the 
economy and thus increase the responsiveness of economic agents to monetary stimulus 
rather than causing macroeconomic imbalances (Saraceno, 2016). 
Thirdly, there is a political issue: intrusive measures such as the budgetary union 
implies a transfer of sovereignty to European institutions, in other words: a political 
union. Indeed, the power to tax and spend the income generated by European individuals 
could only be exercised after a process of democratic and constitutional legitimisation. 
However, it is clear that there is little willingness in Europe today to move in this 
direction, as the re-emerging of nationalistic movements across all the continent - usually 
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critical towards European institutions - symptomizes the detachment of citizens from the 
idea of further political integration.  
The root of the problem lies in the fact that Europeans lack the sense of common 
purpose as well as the feeling of belonging to the same nation, features that are instead 
typical of most sovereign countries (Carl, 2017). The problem is that this sense of unity 
is hard to achieve, since it requires a long span of time to be naturalised in the collective 
imagination. In addition, the enlargement of the Eurozone to a series of Eastern European 
states did not help with the issue, but it has rather weakened the chance to develop a pan 
European-national sentiment (De Grauwe, 2018). As a result, European institutions 
cannot ignore the fact that deeper integration is inseparable from the formation of a 
European cultural identity, therefore greater efforts should be put in this regard. 
In sum, the reforms enucleated in section 3.1 would struggle to be put into practice 
due to the lack of European identity and the risks of inflation/moral hazard that threat 
core countries. On the other hand, these limitations may sound more penalising than they 
are, especially considering the benefits coming from a well-functioning currency union. 
Therefore, member countries should consider the creation of safeguards mechanisms that 
prevent moral hazard from occurring and then agree on a roadmap that leads to further 
integration. 
 
3.3 Towards a two-speed Europe? 
The analysis carried out in the previous sections has emerged the existence of a 
deadlock in EMU: the union possesses structural flaws that hinder the correct functioning 
of the euro area, but despite the evident issues, member countries exercise resistance to 
the implementation of vital reforms such as the creation of a budgetary union. Once the 
path of common reforms is excluded, raising questions on the desirability to maintain the 
currency union in the current form represents the logical consequence to overcome this 
impasse. Among the many proposals on remodelling the eurozone, this section will 
analyse the perspective of a two-speed Europe. 
Building on Stiglitz (2016), a two-speed Europe, or a flexible euro, is the idea that 
EMU should be split into two different regions, each of which equipped with its own 
currency. According to the author, the most plausible scenario would be providing core 
and peripheral countries with a ‘northern euro’ and ‘southern euro’ respectively, since the 
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states belonging to these blocks share more similar macroeconomic fundamentals. This 
new configuration would allow the northern euro to appreciate, determining in turn the 
reduction of core countries’ trade surplus and fixing competitive imbalances with the 
South. At the same time, the southern euro would depreciate, thus increasing the level of 
exports and restoring growth and employment in peripheral countries. Additionally, 
considering the greater homogeneity in terms of business cycles and labour market 
dynamics resulting from this split, the new central banks would be able to pursue more 
effective monetary policies, while governments would have similar needs in terms of 
fiscal policy (Bagnai et al., 2017). The latter point would come to the advantage of 
southern countries who could get rid of austerity (at least in the short term) and undertake 
countercyclical fiscal policies. 
A complementary view is stressed by Arbatova (2017), who argues that the 
different regions could also differentiate from each other on the speed of political 
integration. According to this perspective a smaller group of European states, possibly 
the core countries, should integrate at a faster pace, while the remaining members would 
join the core group once their economies reach greater macroeconomic alignment and 
their political base shows stronger willingness to commit to the cause of political union. 
In essence, this measure would help member countries to overcome the current impasse 
by allowing them to cooperate at different level of integration (Warleigh, 2002). For 
instance, Piris (2011) suggests that the core group could collaborate more intensively on 
defence, security and research, whereas countries who do not wish to give up more 
sovereignty could simply opt out. This view seems to obtain consensus from a part of 
European institutions, as President Macron has publicly endorsed the prospect to adopt a 
common budget and institute a European minister of finance in a limited group of 
countries (The Economist, 2017). 
A revision of the treaties to allow EMU’s fragmentation is not on the agenda at the 
moment, but things could change in the near future as Europe is moving defacto at two 
speeds. Indeed, since the introduction of the euro half the population of the EU has 
improved its standard of living, while the other half has witnessed lower growth, greater 
unemployment, and deeper inequality (see table 3.2) (Matthijs, 2016). Similarly, 
productivity and competitiveness have increased in core countries and decreased in the 
periphery, turning into current accounts imbalances and proving once again a persistent 
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divergence in economic fundamentals among the two regions (Campiglio, 2017). The 
contrast between the lack of future prospects in the South and growing economies in the 
North is also visible from the recent developments in the statistics related to young people 
neither in employment nor in education or training (NEET). Looking at Eurostat data, 
southern countries have a percentage of NEET people that is two/three times higher than 
their northern counterparts (see figure 3.2). An issue, that will produce negative long-
term effects on southern countries’ productivity, given that a large part of young 
individuals is not accumulating human capital through education or developing on-the-
job skills (Helgesson et al., 2014). 
Table 3.2: Change in income inequality ratios in EA12 since 1998 
 
Source: Matthijs (2016) 
 
Figure 3.2: Young people (aged 20 to 34) neither in employment 
nor in education and training in EU countries, 2017 
 
Source: Eurostat (2017:online) 
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Academics have largely debated what are the reasons that could explain these 
growing divergences, with the most common explanations ranging from southern 
countries’ bad management of public finances to the wrong economic policies imposed 
by the Troika (Matthijs, 2016). Whatever the truth may be, the underlying fact is that 
increasing disparities among the two regions are generating a demand for change in 
Europe, and if European institutions are not able to restore convergence and diminish 
inequalities, alternative solutions - such as a ‘two-speed’ Europe - will consequently find 
support in the public opinion. 
Clearly, the perspective of a two-speed Europe is full of uncertainty and entails 
some important limitations. Firstly, there is uncertainty on the response of financial 
markets to the decision of adopting a different currency in southern countries. Indeed, 
investors might be panicked by the prospect of a devaluation and in turn rush to divest 
their money from southern countries’ securities (Belke and Verheyen, 2013). A capital 
flight could result into a liquidity crisis, raising the risk of a default and causing the 
distress of the already weak banking system (Belke and Verheyen, 2013). Besides, the 
prospect of a devaluation would make southern countries more vulnerable to the attack 
of financial speculators, who would seize the opportunity to profit from sovereign bond 
markets and currency’s collapse (Walter and Willett, 2012). 
Secondly, creating a two-speed Europe would essentially divide the EU and weaken 
its power as a foreign policy actor (Chryssogelos, 2017). Undeniably, the greater 
negotiating power associated with speaking with one voice has helped European countries 
to conclude more favourable trade deals in the past decades (Frennhoff and Larsén, 2017), 
a topical issue considering the latest developments in foreign trade policies and the raising 
threat of trade wars. Thirdly, this division might entail the end of the dream of a European 
unification, with the consequent threat of a return to less peaceful neighbourly relations. 
Indeed, this fear was one of the reasons that led to the stipulation of the Treaty of Rome. 
Finally, Stiglitz fails to address the issue of country-level regional disparities. According 
to Calleo (2011), country-level regional differences can be wider than European-level 
ones. For instance, Northern Italy shows greater convergence in competitive conditions 
with Germany rather than with Southern Italy (Calleo, 2011). Therefore, even with 
separating core and peripheral countries, substantial inequalities would persist at the 
regional level.  
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To conclude, a two speed Europe would be a second-best option to amend the 
incompleteness of the monetary union. However, it hides many risks, and hence a careful 
analysis should be carried out before taking hasty decisions. Surprisingly, as 
Holzingerand and Schimmelfennig (2012) report, there is a lack of theoretical research 
on this proposal. Therefore, before making further conclusions on its feasibility, European 
institutions should promote additional research on the topic in order to properly assess 
the costs and benefits of the measure. 
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Conclusion: 
This work questioned whether the European Economic and Monetary Union is an 
optimal currency area, so as to address the widespread concerns over the actual benefits 
of adopting the common currency.  
In order to support this analysis, the first chapter has illustrated a solid theoretical 
framework based on the most important contributions on the topic. In particular, six OCA 
criteria have been identified: namely wage flexibility, labour mobility, fiscal transfers, 
coordinated business cycles, economic and financial integration. According to the 
literature, complying with these criteria is a key step to make sure the benefits of a 
currency union offset its costs. 
In the second chapter, this OCA framework has been applied to EMU, suggesting 
in turn an alarming result: in the current form EMU is not an optimal currency area as 
empirical evidence has let us conclude that four out of six OCA requirements remain 
unfulfilled. For instance, the level of economic integration is inadequate if compared to 
other currency unions, not to mention it has worsened since the introduction of the euro 
due to the effect of trade specialisation. Similarly, the degree of labour mobility and fiscal 
transfers are found to be largely insufficient: cross-border migration is constrained by 
important cultural barriers among member states, while the European budget currently 
represents less than 1% of the Eurozone’s GDP. Turning to the coordination of business 
cycles, the literature shows contrasting results on the topic, but most recent researches 
agree on the existence of a process of desynchronization since the 2008 financial crisis.  
Conversely, wage flexibility and financial integration are the only parameters that 
seem to fulfil the OCA requirements. The first has witnessed an important boost after 
Troika’s employment policy recommendations (particularly in southern countries), 
whereas the latter has benefitted of the enhanced synchronisation in financial markets 
associated with the introduction of the euro. Still, the substantial differences in labour 
market relations and the growing divergences in the composition of capital flows call into 
question the effectiveness of such compliance.  
Finally, the third chapter stressed the need to implement a series of reforms, such 
as the creation of a federal budget, the remodulation of Maastricht parameters, but also 
the issuing of eurobonds and the realisation of a banking union. Unfortunately, so far the 
developments in this direction have been disappointing, held back in particular by the 
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lack of European identity and the risk of inflation/moral hazard. As a result, different 
proposals such as a two-speed have been considered. This concept entails some benefits, 
but has also important limitations as it fails to address critical issues such as the regional 
differences that persist at country-level. 
In sum, on an OCA perspective the euro’s performance has been lacklustre, 
especially in terms of integrating core and peripheral regions. Indeed, the first is 
increasing its prosperity, while the latter suffers of stagnation and lacks future prospects. 
A gloomy reality, which is also reflected by southern countries’ increasing number of 
young people neither in employment, education or training (NEET). Again, in order to 
address these issues, a budgetary union is drastically needed, as it would allow to tackle 
growing inequalities and make the euro more sustainable for depressed regions. If actions 
to smooth these divergences are not undertaken, alternative solutions such as the return 
to national currencies or a two-speed euro will inevitably gain support in the public 
opinion, thus leading to the fragmentation of the monetary union and determining the 
failure of the European dream. 
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